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FOREWORD
One of the hallmarks of a true profession is its ability to assess and regulate itself, especially with respect
to adherence to its foundational ethos. Such self-examination is difficult and often causes discomfort within
the profession. Nonetheless, it is absolutely necessary
to enable members of the profession to render the
service for which the profession exists. U.S. military
professionals have never shied away from this responsibility, and they do not today, as evidenced by
this riveting monograph. Discussing dishonesty in
the Army profession is a topic that will undoubtedly
make many readers uneasy. It is, however, a concern
that must be addressed to better the Army profession.
Through extensive discussions with officers and thorough and sound analysis, Drs. Leonard Wong and
Stephen Gerras make a compelling argument for the
Army to introspectively examine how it might be inadvertently encouraging the very behavior it deems
unacceptable. The unvarnished treatment of this sensitive topic presented by the authors hopefully will be
the start of a dialogue examining this crucial issue.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
While it has been fairly well established that the
Army is quick to pass down requirements to individuals and units regardless of their ability to actually
comply with the totality of the requirements, there has
been very little discussion about how the Army culture has accommodated the deluge of demands on the
force. This study found that many Army officers, after
repeated exposure to the overwhelming demands and
the associated need to put their honor on the line to
verify compliance, have become ethically numb. As a
result, an officer’s signature and word have become
tools to maneuver through the Army bureaucracy
rather than being symbols of integrity and honesty.
Sadly, much of the deception that occurs in the profession of arms is encouraged and sanctioned by the military institution as subordinates are forced to prioritize
which requirements will actually be done to standard
and which will only be reported as done to standard.
As a result, untruthfulness is surprisingly common in
the U.S. military even though members of the profession are loath to admit it.
To address this problem, the authors point out that
the first step toward changing this culture of dishonesty is acknowledging organizational and individual
fallibilities. Until a candid exchange begins within the
Army that includes recognition of the rampant duplicity, the current culture will not improve. The second
recommendation calls for restraint in the propagation
of requirements and compliance checks. Policies and
directives from every level of headquarters should be
analyzed in regard to their impact on the cumulative
load on the force. Finally, the authors recommend
that leaders at all levels must lead truthfully. At the
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highest levels, leading truthfully includes convincing
uniformed and civilian senior leadership of the need
to accept a degree of political risk in reducing requirements. At other levels, leading truthfully may include
striving for 100 percent compliance in all areas, but being satisfied when only 85 percent is reported in some.
The Army profession rests upon a bedrock of trust.
This monograph attempts to bolster that trust by calling attention to the deleterious culture the Army has
inadvertently created.

x
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LYING TO OURSELVES:
DISHONESTY IN THE ARMY PROFESSION
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently stated
that he was “deeply troubled” by the latest spate of
ethical scandals across the military. His spokesman,
Rear Admiral John Kirby, told a news conference, “I
think he’s generally concerned that there could be, at
least at some level, a breakdown in ethical behavior
and in the demonstration of moral courage.” He added, “He’s concerned about the health of the force and
the health of the strong culture of accountability and
responsibility that Americans have come to expect
from their military.”1
Indeed, troubling indicators point to ethical and
moral transgressions occurring across all levels of the
military. In the Air Force, for example, nearly half of
the nuclear missile launch officers at one base were involved with or knew about widespread cheating on an
exam testing knowledge of the missile launch systems.2
In the Navy, 30 senior enlisted instructors responsible
for training sailors in the operation of nuclear reactors were suspended after a sailor alerted superiors
that he had been offered answers to a written test.3 In
the Army, a recent promotion board looking through
the evaluations of senior noncommissioned officers
(NCOs) found that raters were recording deceptively
taller heights in order to keep any NCO weight gain
within Army height/weight standards.4 Additionally,
the constant drumbeat of senior officer misconduct
and ethical failings have included violations ranging
from lavish personal trips at government expense to
hypocritical sexual transgressions.
On one hand, scandals such as these are beneficial
in that they raise visibility of the critical necessity and
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clear expectation of honesty and integrity in the military profession. On the other hand, such scandals are
detrimental not only because they erode the internal
and external trust critical to the institution of the military, but also because they encourage many in the profession to sit in judgment of a few bad apples, while
firmly believing that they themselves would never lie,
cheat, or steal. After all, as Secretary Hagel pointed
out, “the overwhelming majority of our service members are brave, upright and honest people.”5 Dishonesty in the military, however, lies not just with the
misdeeds of a few, but with the potential for deception throughout the entire military. This monograph
examines how untruthfulness is surprisingly common
in the military even though members of the profession
are loath to admit it.
We begin by analyzing the flood of requirements
experienced by military leaders and show that the
military as an institution has created an environment
where it is literally impossible to execute to standard
all that is required. At the same time, reporting noncompliance with the requirements is seldom a viable
option. As a result, the conditions are set where subordinates and units are often forced to determine which
requirements will actually be done to standard and
which will only be reported as done to standard. We
continue by examining the effect on individuals and
analyze how ethical fading and rationalizing allow
individuals to convince themselves that their honor
and integrity are intact despite ethical compromise.
We conclude by recommending open professional
dialogue on the phenomenon, institutional restraint in
the proliferation of requirements, and the acceptance
of risk in leading truthfully at all levels.
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This monograph is not intended to be an indictment of the military profession. Instead, the subsequent pages merely argue that the military needs to
introspectively examine how it might be inadvertently abetting the very behavior it deems unacceptable.
We realize, though, that engaging in such a dialogue
may be awkward and uncomfortable. Because the
U.S. military is simultaneously a functioning organization and a practicing profession, it takes remarkable
courage for a senior leader to acknowledge the gritty
shortcomings and embarrassing frailties of the military as an organization in order to better the military
as a profession. Such a discussion, however, is both
essential and necessary for the health of the military
profession.
While the phenomenon we are addressing afflicts
the entire U.S. military, we focus on the U.S. Army
because it is the institution with which we are most
familiar. While the military profession can be broadly
conceptualized to include anyone who serves in the
Department of Defense (DoD), we give particular attention to the experiences of the Army officer corps.
The officer corps is a bellwether for the military
because, as the Armed Forces Officer points out:
The nation expects more from the military officer: It
expects a living portrayal of the highest standards of
moral and ethical behavior. The expectation is neither
fair nor unfair; it is a simple fact of the profession. The
future of the services and the well-being of its people
depend on the public perception and fact of the honor,
virtue and trustworthiness of the officer corps.6

3

THE DELUGE OF REQUIREMENTS
This analysis began with an exploration into the
avalanche of mandatory training requirements levied throughout the Army. It has been fairly well established that the Army as an institution is quick to
pass down requirements to individuals and units
regardless of their ability to actually comply with
the totality of the requirements. In 2001, the Army
Training and Leader Development Panel noted this
disturbing trend:
Much of the Army, from the most senior levels on
down, no longer follows or cannot follow the Army’s
training management doctrine. The doctrine, when
applied to support mission focus, prioritizes tasks and
locks in training far enough out to provide predictability and allocate resources. It acknowledges that units
cannot do everything because there are not enough
resources, especially time. Today’s Army ignores the
training doctrine.7

In 2002, a U.S. Army War College study tallied all
the training directed at company commanders and
compared that total to the available number of training days. The analysis concluded that:
In the rush by higher headquarters to incorporate every good idea into training, the total number of training days required by all mandatory training directives
literally exceeds the number of training days available
to company commanders. Company commanders
somehow have to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days.8

More recently, in 2012 the Department of the Army
Inspector General (IG) examined how units were cop-
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ing with the deluge of mandatory requirements involved in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)
process. The IG report noted:
At none (0 of 16) of the locations inspected were companies in the ARFORGEN process able to complete all
mandatory training and administrative tasks during
ARFORGEN which impacts their ability to lead effectively and take care of Soldiers.9

Those three reports focus on the detrimental effects on training management due to the suffocating
amount of mandatory requirements imposed upon
units and commanders. Commanders were said to be
harried and stifled as they were inundated by directives from above. Yet these reports only obliquely address a more pernicious phenomenon emerging from
a culture that demands more from the profession’s
members than is possible. If units and individuals
are literally unable to complete the tasks placed upon
them, then reports submitted upward by leaders must
be either admitting noncompliance, or they must be
intentionally inaccurate. Units, however, rarely have
the option to report that they have not completed the
ARFORGEN pre-deployment checklist. Likewise, it is
not an option for individuals to decide that they will
forego sexual assault prevention training this quarter
because they are too busy with other tasks. If reporting noncompliance is not an acceptable alternative
because of the Army’s tendency toward zero defects,
then it is important to examine the resultant institutional implications.
To examine the intersection of the Army’s unbending requirements with the force’s widespread inability to comply with every directive, we looked into the
experiences of officers (and some civilians) throughout the Army. We conducted discussions with scores
5

of officers, including captains (including some from
the U.S. Marine Corps) at Fort Benning, GA, and Fort
Lee, VA; staff officers on the Department of Army
staff in the Pentagon, Washington, DC; majors at Fort
Leavenworth, KS; and former battalion and brigade
commanders at Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Discussions across the force confirm, as previous
reports have noted, that the requirements passed
down from above far exceed the ability of units and
individuals to accomplish them. A former brigade
commander bluntly described the annual training
requirement situation: “It’s more than you can do in
one year.”10 Another officer gave more detail: “The
amount of requirements, if you laid [them] down on
a calendar—all the external stuff you have to do—and
then how much time you have to complete [them]—
it’s physically impossible!” Another officer added his
perspective:
It’s a systemic problem throughout the entire Army . . .
We can probably do two or three things in a day, but if
you give us 20, we’re gonna half-ass 15 and hope you
ignore the other five.

Given that it is impossible to comply with every requirement, how do units and individuals reconcile the
impossible task of accomplishing all directed training
with a bureaucracy that demands confirmation that
every requirement was accomplished? Do they admit
noncompliance? Do they submit false reports?
Before addressing these questions, it should be
noted that U.S. Army officers, and members of the
military profession in general, tend to have a self-image that bristles at any hint of dishonesty. Consider
that according to a recent survey completed by over
20,000 members of the Army, 93 percent of respon6

dents believed that the Army values of loyalty, duty,
respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal
courage line up well with their own personal values.11
This apparent self-confidence in the trustworthiness
of America’s warriors is also mirrored externally by
American society. Each year, the Harris Poll assesses
the confidence that the U.S. public has in the leaders
of major American institutions. For the past decade,
military leaders have been at the top of the list, with
55 percent of Americans reporting that they have a
great deal of confidence in the leaders of the military.
For comparison, leaders in Congress and Wall Street
garnered societal confidence of only 6 percent and 7
percent, respectively, and thus occupied positions at
the other end of the spectrum.12
With such a strong self-image and the reinforcing
perspective of a mostly adoring American society, it is
not surprising that leaders in the military profession
respond with indignation at any whiff of deceit concerning directed training compliance. So, it was not
unexpected for discussions with officers to begin with
bold declarations such as the colonel who pointed out,
“Nobody was ever asked to report something as true
that was not,” or the captain who emphatically stated,
“I have never given a false report. Never intentionally
have I said, ‘Yes, we’re 100% on this,’ when I knew we
weren’t.”
After a few minutes into the discussion (usually
about 20), however, hints would inevitably emerge
that there was something deeper involved in the situation. For example, one senior officer reflected upon the
pressures of complying with every training directive
and stated, “You find ways to qualify your answer.
It’s not quibbling—it’s assuming risk.” When pressed
for specifics on how they managed, officers tended to
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dodge the issue with statements such as, “You gotta
make priorities, we met the intent, or we got creative.”
Eventually words and phrases such as “hand waving, fudging, massaging, or checking the box” would
surface to sugarcoat the hard reality that, in order to
satisfy compliance with the surfeit of directed requirements from above, officers resort to evasion and deception. In other words, in the routine performance
of their duties as leaders and commanders, U.S. Army
officers lie.
Once officers conceded that they did, indeed, occasionally misrepresent the truth concerning compliance with directives, admissions tended to flow more
freely. One former battalion commander commented,
“We’ve always pencil-whipped training.” A captain
recalled a specific example of dealing with the overwhelming requirements:
For us, it was those little tasks that had to get done
when we got returned from predeployment block
leave—the number of taskings went through the roof.
None [by] themselves were extremely extensive—like
a 15-minute online course. The problem was getting
your formation to do it with the availability of computers and then the ability to print and prove that you
had taken it. So I think that some of the training got
lost in translation. For a nine-man squad, they would
pick the smartest dude, and he would go and take it
nine times for the other members of his squad and
then that way they had a certificate to prove that they
had completed it.

Another captain had a similar experience:
I had a platoon sergeant when I first became a platoon leader, and I walked into the office and he was
printing out certificates with people’s names on them.
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I was like, “What are you doing?” He says, “Mandatory training!” It was so accepted. It’s almost like
corruption.

HONESTLY CONFRONTING DISHONESTY
Dishonesty, however, is not restricted just to reports of mandatory training. While the truth is often
sidestepped in reporting compliance with directed
requirements, dishonesty and deception are also
prevalent in many other realms of the Army. Deceit
can also appear in maintenance, supply, or other official reporting. For example, one captain spoke of the
deception in vehicle readiness reporting:
I sat in a log synch and they’re like, “What’s your vehicle percentage?” I said, “I’m at 90%.” [But] if [anyone]
told me to move them tomorrow, [I knew] they would
all break. For months and months and months we reported up “90%, Good-to-go on vehicles!”–knowing
that it didn’t matter because it carried no weight. It
literally was just filling a box on a slide.

Another captain gave an example of the half-truths
commonly found in property accountability:
We had this antenna and it had a serial number, but
it was a component of the antenna. . . . We would
always joke that if the Army were ever audited, and
you looked at everything the Army was supposed to
have, it would likely have most of it. However, would
it really be of value or use or would you have a piece
of plastic with a serial number that counted as an antenna? . . . We weren’t lying. We met the requirement
at its minimum and that’s what we sent up. We gave
them what they wanted.
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Examples of deceit also emerged in a wide variety
of other areas concerning compliance with directed
actions. According to a senior officer, “A command
inspection is required within 90 days of company
command. People don’t do it. They make it up.” One
colonel spoke of inaccurate reporting following an undesirable directive: “We were asked to go to off-post
housing to check on soldier quality of life. Folks were
uncomfortable going so they pencil-whipped it.” In
the words of another senior officer, “We have levied
[on us] so many information demands that we infer
that if I’m not asked specifics, they really don’t care.
So I’ll just report ambiguous info.”
An officer related his experience with the Travel
Risk Planning System (TRiPS) form required for
soldiers going on leave or pass:
A soldier dying on vacation because of sleep deprivation is a horrible loss. So it is absolutely something we
need to mitigate. However the focus for pretty much
damn [near] every soldier is, ‘Hey, I just need to get
this done so I can get my leave form in and get it approved.’ So what do you do? You know what answers
the survey wants. You click those answers. And it’s
sad, but it’s the way it works.

Another common (and innocuous) form of deceit
in the U.S. Army officer corps concerns the evaluation
reporting system. The dishonesty occurs not in the
actual prose of the Officer Evaluation Report (OER)/
NCO Evaluation Report (NCOER) (although an analysis of the over-the-top hyperbole in evaluations would
make an interesting study), but rather with the associated OER/NCOER Support Form. Army Regulation
623-3, Evaluation Reporting System, states that a rater
must conduct an initial counseling with the rated of-
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ficer/NCO within the first 30 days of the rating period, followed by additional counseling sessions every
quarter. To verify compliance with this directive, the
rated officer/NCO, the rater, and the senior rater must
initial—or on the newest version, digitally sign—the
support form.
It is the exception, not the rule, that the face-to-face
counseling mandated by the regulation and verified
by three members of the chain of command ever occurs. While initial counseling sessions may have a
chance of being accomplished, compliance with the
quarterly counseling requirement is extremely rare.
Yet each year, tens of thousands of support forms are
submitted with untruthful information. Interestingly,
fabricating dates that the directed counseling supposedly took place is both expected and unremarkable (as
long as the contrived dates do not fall on a weekend).
To the average officer, it is the way business is done
in the Army. Admitting that the counseling did not
take place is very seldom an option. In the words of
a major, “The Army would rather us make up dates
saying, ‘Yes, we did it’ as opposed to saying, ‘Hey, I
messed up.’”
With such widespread evidence that Army individuals and units are surrounded by a culture where
deceptive information is both accepted and commonplace, we sought to examine the situation from the
perspective of those who receive the flawed information. Are the recipients of the data and reports aware
that the information provided to them may not be
accurate? We looked to the views of civilians and officers serving on the Department of the Army staff in
the Pentagon for some insights. Discussions revealed
that most Army staff officers recognize that much of
the data provided to them is imprecise.
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When asked if units are submitting inaccurate
data, one staff officer bluntly replied, “Sure, I used to
do it when I was down there.” Another staff officer
added, “Nobody believes the data; [senior leaders]
take it with a grain of salt . . . The data isn’t valued,
probably because they know the data isn’t accurate.”
Another clarified, “Everyone does the best they can,
but we know the data is wrong.” One officer summed
up the situation, “We don’t trust our compliance data.
There’s no system to track it. If we frame something
as compliance, people ‘check the block.’ They will
quibble and the Army staff knows it.”
Likewise, most former battalion commanders admitted that, in their roles as data receivers, many of
the slides briefed to them showing 100 percent compliance or the responses given them for information
requests were probably too optimistic or inaccurate.
For example, one colonel described how his brigade
commander needed to turn in his situation report on
Friday, forcing the battalions to do theirs on Thursday,
and therefore the companies submitted their data on
Wednesday—necessitating the companies to describe
events that had not even occurred yet. The end result
was that, while the companies gave it their best shot,
everyone including the battalion commander knew
that the company reports were not accurate.
Meanwhile, officers at all levels admit to occasionally feeding the Army institution information that—
although it is “what they want to hear”—is not totally
honest. As a result, it appears that a peculiar situation
emerges where both those requesting information and
those supplying it know that the information is questionable. Despite the existence of this mutually agreed
deception, all concerned are content to sanction and
support the illusion that all is well. In the words of
one Department of the Army staff officer, “The façade
12

goes all the way up.” The façade allows the Army
to continue functioning—slides are briefed as green,
compliance is shown to be almost always 100 percent,
and queries from Congress, DoD, or higher headquarters are answered on time.
DOWNRANGE
One might expect that ethical boundaries are more
plainly delineated in a combat environment—the
stakes are higher, and the mission is more clearly focused. Discussions with officers, however, revealed
that many of the same issues in the garrison environment also emerge in combat. For example, a senior
officer described how the combat mission can lead to
putting the right “spin” on reports: “We got so focused
on getting bodies to combat that we overlooked a lot
of issues like weight control, alcohol, or PT.” Not surprisingly, directed training is also often sidestepped
in theater. One captain spoke of trying to complete
mandatory Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Program (SHARP) training:
We needed to get SHARP training done and reported
to higher headquarters, so we called the platoons and
told them to gather the boys around the radio and
we said, ‘Don’t touch girls.’ That was our quarterly
SHARP training.

But stretching the truth downrange often extends
beyond compliance with mandatory training. A major described how Green 2 sensitive item reports were
submitted early every morning. Despite the usual 100
percent accountability, however, it was obvious that
it could not have been conducted to standard since
nobody ever knocked on their doors to check weapon
13

serial numbers. Another officer related how supply
accountability in a combat zone could be manipulated
by misrepresenting the truth:
We found ways to beat the system. You show up in
country and you get a layout and immediately what
do you do? You do a shortage annex for everything. So
that way the Army—with an infinite budget in country—would replenish your product [even though] the
unit never really lost the equipment in the beginning.

Discussions with senior officers revealed other examples of bending the truth. One colonel stated that,
“The cost of investigating a lost widget isn’t worth the
cost of the item; they write it off and later say it was
lost to the Pakistanis.” Another colonel stated:
We were required to inspect 150 polling sites in Iraq
(which nobody could possibly ever do) and fill out
an elaborate spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was to get
validation for higher that you did what they told you
to. We gave them what they wanted.

One frequently provided example of deception at
the senior level concerned readiness assessments of
partner forces. It was not uncommon for readiness ratings to vary in conjunction with deployment cycles. In
other words, the commander’s assessments were not
based so much on the counterpart unit capabilities as
they were on the American unit stage of deployment.
As one colonel explained:
I show up and [the readiness assessments] go yellow
or green to red. I’m ready to leave – they go from yellow to green. We went through the reports with the
CG every ninety days. Everyone wanted to believe
what they wanted to believe.
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One widespread recurring requirement for junior leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq was the storyboard—a PowerPoint narrative describing unit events
and occurrences. One senior officer pointed out,
however, that:
Every contact with the enemy required a storyboard.
People did not report enemy contact because they
knew the storyboard was useless and they didn’t want
to go through the hassle.

A captain gave his perspective and his eventual
approach to providing incomplete and inaccurate
storyboards to higher headquarters:
I understand there is a higher reporting requirement of which I reported verbally, and I did a proper
debrief—I wrote it down and then I sent it to them.
[But now] I have to combine a bunch of pictures
onto a PowerPoint slide. Now I’m doing this storyboard because there’s an IED, because a donkey fell
off the mountain, because some dude’s dog came in
and I had to shoot it on the COP and now this dude
is mad. It became an absolute burden. So what ended
up happening was [that] after about the first couple of
months, you’re saving your storyboards, and as soon
as you had an incident that [was] somewhat similar to
what you already had, it became a cut and paste gig.
And the quality of the information that you are giving
them wasn’t painting the picture for higher as to what
was going on. And you can say, “Yes, Lieutenant, you
should have done better.” You’re absolutely right. But
when I only had 4 hours between this mission and the
next, what’s better – spending 15 minutes to make this
beautiful storyboard or planning my next operation?
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The attitude of “I don’t need to tell anyone what
happened” was also found in other areas where it
was perceived that the reporting requirements were
too onerous. For example, one officer discussed his
unit’s failure to ask permission to respond to indirect
fire (IDF):
Counterfire became a big issue in terms of [the] ability to counterfire when you were receiving IDF. Some
companies in our battalion were returning fire without
an accurate grid. They got shot at so they shot back.
Of course, they were out in the middle of nowhere
with a low chance of collateral damage. [But] people
in our battalion knew, and just didn’t say anything.
I’m not sure how high up people knew, but it was accepted. That was the norm. We’ll just not say anything
about it.

Another area that reflected the malleability of ethical standards was the distribution of cash through the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).
As one senior officer noted, “CERP is not tracked
in detail and everyone knows it.” Another colonel
observed:
CERP money is an area where we probably fudge.
We gave company commanders a lot of money that
we powered down to people who weren’t trained. We
probably submitted reports that weren’t accurate.

ETHICAL FADING
At the outset of this monograph, it was brashly
declared that most U.S. Army officers routinely lie.
It would not be surprising if many uniformed readers raised a skeptical eyebrow at that claim. Indeed, it
would not be unusual for nearly all military readers to
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maintain a self-identity that takes offense with notions
of dishonesty or deception. Ironically, though, many
of the same people who flinched at that initial accusation of deceit probably yawned with each new example of untruthfulness offered in the preceding pages.
“White” lies and “innocent” mistruths have become
so commonplace in the U.S. Army that there is often
no ethical angst, no deep soul-searching, and no righteous outrage when examples of routine dishonesty
are encountered. Mutually agreed deception exists in
the Army because many decisions to lie, cheat, or steal
are simply no longer viewed as ethical choices.
Behavioral ethics experts point out that people often fail to recognize the moral components of an ethical decision because of ethical fading. Ethical fading
occurs when the “moral colors of an ethical decision
fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications.”13 Ethical fading allows us to convince ourselves
that considerations of right or wrong are not applicable to decisions that in any other circumstances would
be ethical dilemmas. This is not so much because we
lack a moral foundation or adequate ethics training,
but because psychological processes and influencing
factors subtly neutralize the “ethics” from an ethical
dilemma. Ethical fading allows Army officers to transform morally wrong behavior into socially acceptable
conduct by dimming the glare and guilt of the ethical
spotlight.
One factor that encourages ethical fading in the
Army is the use of euphemisms and obscure phrases to
disguise the ethical principles involved in decisions.14
Phrases such as checking the box and giving them
what they want abound and focus attention on the
Army’s annoying administrative demands rather than
dwelling on the implications of dishonesty in official

17

reports. Indeed, many officers even go as far as to insist that lying to the system can better be described as
prioritizing, accepting prudent risk, or simply good
leadership.
A more recent and significant development concerning ethical fading is the exponential growth in the
number of occasions that an officer is obliged to confirm or verify compliance with requirements. When it
comes to requirements for units and individuals, the
Army resembles a compulsive hoarder. It is excessively permissive in allowing the creation of new requirements, but it is also amazingly reluctant to discard
old demands. The result is a rapid accumulation of
directives passed down, data calls sent out, and new
requirements generated by the Army. Importantly,
the Army relies on leaders to enforce compliance of
the increasing amount of requirements and to certify
the accuracy of the expanding number of reports sent
upward.
The first time that officers sign an OER support
form authenticating a counseling session that never
happened or check a box saying, “I have read the
above requirements” when they really only glanced
at the 1,800-word IA acceptable use policy, they might
feel a tinge of ethical concern. After repeated exposure to the burgeoning demands and the associated
need to put their honor on the line, however, officers
become ethically numb. Eventually, their signature
and word become tools to maneuver through the
Army bureaucracy rather than symbols of integrity
and honesty.15 This desensitization dilutes the seriousness of an officer’s word and allows what should
be an ethical decision to fade into just another way
the Army does business. To make matters worse,
technological advances and the cumulative effects of
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time have led to today’s officers facing a much larger amount of information to corroborate than their
predecessors.
Ethical fading is also influenced by the psychological distance from an individual to the actual point of
dishonesty or deception. Lying, cheating, and stealing
become easier to choose when there are more steps
between an officer and the dishonest act—the greater
the distance, the greater the chance for ethical fading.16
Thus, most officers would be extremely uncomfortable
telling their rater face-to-face that their unit completed ARFORGEN pre-deployment NBC training when
they, in fact, did not. Those same officers, however,
would probably be more comfortable conveying the
same mistruth via a block checked on the ARFORGEN
checklist. Likewise, a digital, instead of handwritten,
signature on a sponsorship form attesting that an officer was briefed on the sponsorship program prior to
PCSing—when they were not—broadens the separation between the officer and the dishonest act. Even
the Army’s ubiquitous PowerPoint charts provide
briefers the ability to focus on intricate color coded
metrics and thus distance themselves from the inaccurate or ambiguous information the metrics may be
conveying.
The psychological distance between a person and
the consequences of a dishonest act can also influence ethical fading. A moral decision can lose its ethical overtones if the eventual repercussions of such a
choice are either unknown or minimized. For example, the explanation of an officer concerning inaccurate storyboards is illustrative of the common perception that much of the information submitted upward
disappears into the ether of the Army bureaucracy:
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Where do the story boards go? They’re going to [a]
magic storyboard heaven somewhere where there are
billions of storyboards that are collected or logged
somehow? After doing hundreds of storyboards, I
honestly can’t tell you where any of them go. I send
them to my battalion level element who does something with them who then sends them to some other
element who eventually puts them on a screen in front
of somebody who then prints them out and shreds
them? I don’t know.

Dismissing any potential damage that may result from a misleading or incomplete storyboard allows leaders to view the requirement as yet another
petty bureaucratic obligation void of any ethical
considerations.
MAKING EXCUSES
With ethical fading serving to bolster the self-deception that problematic moral decisions are ethicsneutral, any remaining ethical doubts can be overcome by justifications and rationalizations. While
discussions with officers revealed a wide assortment
of justifications for unethical behavior, one rationalization appears to underlie all other rationalizations—
that dishonesty is often necessary because the directed
task, the data requested, or the reporting requirement
is unreasonable or “dumb.” When a demand is perceived as an irritation or annoyance, a person’s less
than honest response almost becomes a compensatory act against the injustice.17 Officers convince themselves that instead of being unethical, they are really
restoring a sense of balance and sanity to the Army.
For example, one officer spoke of the distinction he
made between useful and useless required reports:
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You can [ask] anybody in this room—the purpose of
sending a SALTA or declaring a TIC, CASEVAC—not
a MEDEVAC nine lines—we definitely know why we
do that stuff and why we’re reporting. And people
jump. They’re timely. They’re accurate . . . But some
of this stuff is: You need this for why? Show me in
the reports guide that we use or wherever [that] this is
actually a required report. Because right now it seems
like you’re just wasting a unit leader’s time.

Another officer rationalized how ethical standards
should be loosened for requirements perceived as
unimportant:
If it’s a green tab leader that’s asking me for information—the battalion commander, brigade commander,
or something the division commander is going to
see—then I would sit down and do it. That would be
accurate reporting. If it was something that was going
into a staff and wasn’t going to drive a critical decision
the battalion made in terms of training or something
I need to accomplish for a METL task . . . what goes
up, goes up. Is it probably a little off? Yeah, there’s a
margin of error.

Finally, one officer, in euphemistic terms, summarized the Army’s tolerance for deception on seemingly
meaningless requirements:
I don’t think it’s that anyone expects you to lie. But
I think there is an expectation of—I think the word
is—equivocation . . . I don’t want to say it’s accepted,
because that doesn’t sound good or it doesn’t sound
right. But I think some expectation of equivocation is
accepted on dumb things.

21

Two other rationalizations are often used as justifications for dishonesty—mission accomplishment and
supporting the troops. With these rationalizations, the
use of deceit or submitting inaccurate information is
viewed as an altruistic gesture carried out to benefit a
unit or its soldiers. Officers reported that they sometimes needed to act as Robin Hood—going outside
the ethical boundaries to assist others. As one officer
nobly put it:
I’m just going to “check this box” . . . and if I’m 70%
accurate—that’s good enough to 1) keep my guys out
of trouble and 2) keep my boss out of trouble so we
can keep doing good things for the country.

One captain recalled an instance where an IED injured a platoon leader and his replacement during a
relief in place. The incident required an assessment of
possible traumatic brain injury for both lieutenants.
The captain explained:
I falsified the [traumatic brain injury] report that
changed a distance from the IED strike [to where]
one person was standing. So that way someone didn’t
come back down and stick a finger in my CO’s chest
and say, “You need to evac that lieutenant right now!”
Because in the middle of [a] RIP, that’s not going to
happen. If I do that, I’m going to put my boys in bags
because they don’t have any leadership. That ain’t
happening. I owe the parents of this country more
than that.

Another officer rationalized how funds were deceptively obtained in theater on behalf of the troops:
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It’s odd that in situations that I’ve been in, it’s never
been blatant self-interest. It’s never been, “I’m going to
get this money so I can buy myself two couches for my
office while I’m in Afghanistan.” [Instead], it’s always
like—for us, it was hard as hell to get water heaters.
For some reason we could not get hot showers for our
soldiers. It wasn’t CERP money, but we had to finagle
God-knows-how-many organizations to finally get
these things and we had to say we’re using this for
this, when in fact it was so our guys could have hot
showers when they get back off patrol. The truth of the
matter is that, at the level that we’re at, a lot of times
we gotta get it done and we’re going to find a way to
do it.

Another officer accurately described how the
rationalization process softens the sting of dishonesty:
You feel more comfortable if it’s not for us—if it’s for
what we think is the greater good. Like [lying about]
all the 350-1 requirements prior to going on block
leave. I want my soldiers to go on leave . . . It’s not for
me. It’s for the greater good. [But] that doesn’t mean
it’s right.

Rationalizing allows officers to maintain their
self-image as a person of integrity despite acts of
dishonesty.
LYING TO OURSELVES
It may be that this monograph has merely identified a phenomenon that has existed quietly in the
Army (and in most large bureaucracies) since time
immemorial. It may be that lying to the “little old
lady in tennis shoes” in order to clear post, fudging a
trusted NCO’s weight on an NCOER, or writing off a
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CONEX of surplus Oakleys is emblematic of actions
that the Army will seldom discuss, but will always
tolerate. Perhaps the stereotypical supply sergeant’s
response of “You don’t want to know” will always
be the proper response to the question of “Where
did this stuff come from?” It could be that as long as
dishonesty and deceit are restricted to the trivial and
bothersome aspects of the Army, the status quo represents the best way to deal with an out of control,
overbearing Army bureaucracy. After all, dishonesty
in the Army is not new. For example, in the summer of 1970, researchers at the U.S. Army War College published the Study on Military Professionalism
which found that, “Inaccurate reporting—rampant
throughout the Army and perceived by every grade
level sampled from O-2 through O-7—is significant.”18
The report quoted a captain who, at the height of the
Vietnam War, stated that, “It’s necessary today, to
lie, cheat, and steal to meet the impossible demands
of higher officers or continue to meet the statistical
requirements.”19
Acquiescence to the status quo because the Army
has been dogged by the same problems in the past,
however, ignores several potentially destructive implications of the current culture. First, while discussions revealed that nearly all officers were confident
in their ability to correctly determine which requirements were trivial or nonsensical, those judgments
can vary widely across individuals and groups. For
example, some officers offered that not reporting a
negligent discharge (ND) was a common example of
acceptable lying, especially when it was a simple mistake and easily remedied without getting higher headquarters involved. Other officers, particularly those in
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the combat arms, insisted that an ND was a serious
breach of discipline and leaders were duty bound to
send a report upward. Similarly, some officers were
aghast that anyone would submit inaccurate or incomplete storyboards, while others were much more
accepting of less than precise submissions. Confusion
and inconsistency across the force result from allowing individual interpretations to determine where to
delineate the bounds of acceptable dishonesty. As one
captain astutely noted:
I think a real danger—since it’s unsaid and it’s not out
there— is [that] we’re requiring every single person at
every single level to make their own determination on
what they want to lie about. Because we’re all setting
a different standard and because we can’t talk about
it, we’re obviously going to have the potential for the
guys who take it too far.

Tolerating a level of dishonesty in areas deemed
trivial or unimportant also results in the degradation
of the trust that is vital to the military profession. Once
the bar of ethical standards is lowered, the malleability of those standards becomes a rationale for other unethical decisions. For example, one officer explained
why CERP money was easily misused:
I think the reason why we have an easier time accepting that CERP money might be used by people falsely
is because you look at the institutional Army and see
all the fraud, waste, and abuse that happens at every
level.

The slippery slope of ethical compromise is a real
and legitimate danger to the assumption of truth in
the profession. Noted ethicist Sissella Bok explains
this threat in more detail:
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Of course, we know that many lies are trivial. But since
we, when lied to, have no way to judge which lies are
the trivial ones, and since we have no confidence that
liars will restrict themselves to just such trivial lies, the
perspective of the deceived leads us to be wary of all
deception.20

Just as it is imprudent to expect absolute impeccability from the officer corps, it is also foolhardy
to condone a casual view of deceit and duplicity in
the ranks. Disregarding the pervasive dishonesty
throughout the Army leads to the eventual conclusion
that nothing and no one can be trusted. As Saint Augustine wisely noted, “When regard for truth has been
broken down or even slightly weakened, all things remain doubtful.”21
Making excuses for an acceptable level of dishonesty also provides cover for deception that is less nobly motivated. While difficult to admit, many officers
acutely feel the pressure of peer competition influencing their ethical decisions. As one officer pointed out:
You’re a bad leader and you failed if you didn’t get
everyone through the hour-long human trafficking
thing. All the other company commanders in the United States Army somehow managed to do it and you’re
gonna be the only guy that didn’t do it because you
[truthfully] reported 85%.

Careerism is a potent force that serves as a catalyst
for dishonesty. The current downsizing intensifies the
competition in the ranks with very few officers desiring to be “alone on the island.” In the words of one
candid officer:
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We’re all kind of vultures. The one guy [who told
the truth] – get him. He exposed himself. And no one
wants to stand out. We all see reductions are being
made. If you’re looking to do this [stay in the Army]
for a long period of time, your intent is to appease the
person above you. Just like the person you’re appeasing made that decision a long time ago.

Convincing ourselves that deceitfulness in the
Army is mostly well-intentioned altruism serves to
mask the caustic effects of lying, cheating, or stealing
for self-advancement. As a very perceptive captain
observed:
In our own eyes and our perspective, we do things for
the right reasons. When you really come down to it
[though], the big question is that while you may be
saying you did it for the good of your men, or you did
it for the right reasons, how is that different at the end
of the day from someone who didn’t?

The gravest peril of the tacit acceptance of dishonesty, however, is the facilitation of hypocrisy in Army
leaders. The Army as a profession speaks of values,
integrity, and honor. The Army as an organization
practices zero defects, pencil-whipping, and checking
the box. Army leaders are situated between the two
identities—parroting the talking points of the latest
Army Profession Campaign while placating the Army
bureaucracy or civilian overseers by telling them what
they want to hear. As a result, Army leaders learn to
talk of one world while living in another. A major described the current trend:
It’s getting to the point where you’re almost rewarded
for being somebody you’re not. That’s a dangerous situation especially now as we downsize. We’re creating
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an environment where everything is too rosy because
everyone is afraid to paint the true picture. You just
wonder where it will break, when it will fall apart.

At the strategic level, it is this hypocrisy that allows
senior Army leaders to unconcernedly shift a billion
dollars to overseas contingency operations funding to
minimize the base budget or to brief as fact the number of sexual assault response coordinators when the
data are obviously suspect. At the operational level, it
is this self-deception that makes it easy for leaders to
dismiss equivocation and false reports to “bad” units
and attribute pencil-whipping and fudging to “weak”
leaders. At the tactical level, it is this duplicity that
allows leaders to “feed the beast” bogus information
while maintaining a self-identity of someone who
does not lie, cheat, or steal.
CONFRONTING THE TRUTH
While the preceding pages paint a somewhat dire
picture, there is still much to be celebrated in the military profession. The military remains a noble profession filled with competent and committed servants
of the nation. And yet the profession’s foundation of
trust is slowly being eroded by the corrupting influence of duplicity and deceit. Ignoring dishonesty as
a minor shortcoming or writing it off as an inevitable
aspect of bureaucracy accomplishes nothing. Instead,
the Army must take some rather drastic measures in
order to correct the current deleterious culture. Three
broad recommendations are offered here. Each will be
difficult to implement because of the entrenched culture, but each is critical to restoring trust in the Army
profession.
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Acknowledge the Problem.
Dishonesty is a topic that many in the Army are
extremely uncomfortable discussing openly. While
junior officers tend to freely describe their struggles
in maintaining their integrity in a culture that breeds
dishonesty, senior officers are often reluctant to admit
their personal failings in front of subordinates (or in
the case of very senior officers, their peers). The need
to preserve a “professional” appearance is just too
strong for many senior officers to personalize their
dealings with the Army culture. They can easily lecture about the ideals of integrity and honor, but many
find it extremely difficult to admit that they too have
encountered (and currently live with) a culture that
condones dishonesty. The result is that dishonesty in
the Army can be a topic for DFAC lunch table gripe
sessions, but seldom for LPDs or addresses by senior
leaders. In the meantime, the requirements passed
down from higher become more numerous and the
slow slide down the ethical slope continues. Until a
candid exchange concerning dishonesty begins, the
current culture will not improve.
Openly dealing with deception in the Army formation also serves to prevent a subtle hazard of the current situation—hubris. In the past 2 decades, the Army
has dramatically revitalized its status as a profession.
There has been a resurgence in analyzing the Army as
a profession and examining all the attendant implications. Additionally, polls show that public confidence
in the military remains the highest of all American institutions, and it is still common for those in uniform
to hear, “Thank you for your service” from complete
strangers. Indeed, the professional all-volunteer force
has served the nation well in a difficult time of war
and conflict.
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The effusive public adulation and constant professional self-talk, however, can also lead to excessive
pride and self-exaltation. Overconfidence can leave
officers—especially those at the senior level—vulnerable to the belief that they are unimperiled by the temptations and snares found at the common level of life.
The ease of fudging on a TDY voucher, the enticement
of improper gifts, and the allure of an illicit relationship are minimized and discounted as concerns faced
by lesser mortals.
Tradition has it that in ancient Rome, a triumphant general would ride in a celebratory procession
through the city after a key battlefield victory. Always
standing in the chariot behind the general, however,
was a slave who whispered into the ear of the general,
“Respice post te! Hominem te memento!” meaning “Look
behind you! Remember that you are but a man!”22
Acknowledging organizational and individual fallibilities is the first step toward changing the culture of
dishonesty plaguing the Army.
Exercise Restraint.
It is no secret that units and individuals are overwhelmed by the amount of requirements and directives placed upon them. Therefore, restraint must
be established in the amount of mandatory training
passed down to the force. Instead of making lower level leaders decide which mandatory training or directive they will ignore (but still report 100 percent compliance), leaders at the strategic level must shoulder
the burden of prioritizing which directives are truly
required. Abdicating that responsibility at the senior
level understandably avoids the unpleasant task of informing a proponent, stakeholder, or constituent that
his or her particular concern is not a top priority in the
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Army. Additionally, it gives the Army plausible deniability if something does go wrong. But it also leaves
leaders at the lowest levels with no choice but to sacrifice their integrity in order to prop up the façade that
all is well.
Of course, exercising restraint is difficult in an
organization as large as the Army. Each staff, each
level of headquarters, and each senior leader that
adds a requirement earnestly believes in the importance and necessity of that requirement. Therefore
restraint cannot be achieved merely by announcing it
and expecting everyone to curb their propensity for
new ideas. Instead, restraint will be exercised when a
central authority, armed with a clear understanding
of the time and resource constrained environment of
the Army, examines and vets the entirety of requirements. While AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader
Development, is the obvious candidate for this added
scrutiny, ALARACTS, policies from major commands, and directives from all headquarters should
also be analyzed in regard to their impact on the
cumulative load.
Restraint also needs to be introduced into the
rampant use of an officer’s integrity for frivolous purposes. Too often, the Army turns to an officer’s integrity to verify compliance of minor concerns instead
of other means such as sampling or auditing. For example, requiring all officers to attest on their OERs
that they have initiated a multi-source assessment and
feedback (MSAF) in the last 3 years probably has the
well-intended purpose of socializing the force to 360°
feedback. But the unanticipated outcome has been the
diminution of the gravitas of an officer’s signature as
rated officers, raters, and senior raters dismiss the requirement as an administrative nuisance rather than
an ethical choice. (That the MSAF requirement could
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be easily verified through automation compounds the
problem). The Army must restore the dignity and seriousness of an officer’s word by requiring it for consequential issues rather than incidental administrative
requirements.
Lead Truthfully.
As the institution acknowledges the current situation and begins exercising restraint, leaders at all levels must focus on leading truthfully. Leading truthfully dismantles the façade of mutually agreed deception
by putting considerations of the integrity of the profession back into the decisionmaking process. Thus,
at the senior level, leading truthfully may include
informing a political appointee that while bath salts
are a scourge to American teens, the problem may not
merit Army-wide mandatory training until some other
topic is removed. Leading truthfully may also include
tolerating risk by striving for 100 percent compliance
in all areas, but being satisfied when only 85 percent is
reported in some. Leading truthfully may also involve
brutally honest reporting from subordinates who
risk being labeled malcontents or slackers because of
their candor.
A focused emphasis on leading truthfully goes beyond inserting an online block of instruction on ethics, scheduling an ethics stand down, or creating an
ethics center of excellence. Instead, leading truthfully
attempts to preempt ethical fading by examining the
moral implications of a leader’s decision first instead
of rationalizing them away after the fact. Finally, leading truthfully changes the culture gradually and will
only be effective if embraced by all leaders, not just a
token few.
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The Army profession rests upon a bedrock of trust.
That trust continues to be treasured and guarded,
but an alternative ethical reality has emerged where
junior officers are socialized into believing that pencil-whipping the stats and feeding the beast are not
only routine, but expected. This alternative reality is
a place where senior officers romanticize the past and
convince themselves that they somehow managed to
achieve their station in life without tarnishing their
own integrity.
Unfortunately, the boundaries of this parallel
ethical universe are slowly expanding into more and
more of the profession. Ethical fading and rampant
rationalizations have allowed leaders to espouse lofty
professional values while slogging through the mire
of dishonesty and deceit. The end result is a corrosive
ethical culture that few acknowledge and even fewer
discuss or work to correct. The Army urgently needs
to address the corrupting influence of dishonesty in
the Army profession. This monograph is but one small
step toward initiating that conversation and perhaps
stimulating a modicum of action.
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